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COMPELLING ALTERNATIVES: THE AUTHORITY OF
FEDERAL JUDGES TO ORDER SUMMARY JURY
TRIAL PARTICIPATION
INTRODUCTION
The expanding use of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") tech-
niques is among the most striking of modern developments in the prac-
tice of law in the United States.' In recent years, congestion2 in the
dockets of federal courts has worsened because of increased civil filings
and the introduction of newly created substantive rights.3 These trends
1. Alternative dispute resolution has been defined as:
a set of practices and techniques that aim (1) to permit legal disputes to be
resolved outside the courts for the benefit of all disputants; (2) to reduce the
cost of conventional litigation and the delays to which it is ordinarily subject; or
(3) to prevent legal disputes which would otherwise likely be brought to the
courts.
Henry & Lieberman, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 424, 425-26 (1986). See generally Center for Public Resources Legal Pro-
gram, Containing Legal Costs: ADR Strategies for Corporations, Law Firms and Gov-
ernment (1988) (description of forms and application of ADR for business, law firms and
government agencies); C. Harrington, Shadow Justice: The Ideology and Institutional-
ization of Alternatives to Court (1985) (critique of social impact of institutionalizing
ADR techniques); Essays on the Future of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 14 Pepperdine
L. Rev. 771 (1987) (explaining perceived trends in future of ADR); Levin & Golash,
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Federal District Courts, 37 U. Fla. L. Rev. 29 (1985)
(overview and analysis of various ADR applications in federal litigation).
Commonly used ADR techniques include mediation, arbitration, summary jury trials
and mini-trials. See Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of
Dispute Resolution: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee
on the Operation of the Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 461, 465-67 (1984) In recent years,
private dispute resolution services have been organized. See, Wiehl, Private Justice For a
Fee: Profits and Problems, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1989, at B5, col. 3. Certain types of
conflicts are particularly good candidates for alternative dispute resolution, either be-
cause there are large numbers of such cases before the courts, or because the disputes are
complex, requiring a great deal of court time. See Brunet, Questioning the Quality of
Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (1987) (commentators recommend
substituting ADR for conventional litigation in a variety of areas, including government
contracts disputes, broker-customer relations, international trade, higher education, med-
ical malpractice, and race relations).
2. During the 1970s, the number of cases filed in federal district courts more than
doubled. See Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding
a Case From Filing to Disposition, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 770, 770 (1981). More recently, the
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts reported that on June
30, 1983, the number of civil cases pending before United States District Courts totaled
231,920. See Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States
114 table 3 (1983). By June 30, 1987, the number of pending cases had grown to 243,159.
See Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 169 table
C (1987). The number of cases involving protracted trials has also increased; the number
of trials lasting more than thirty days tripled during the 1970s. See Peckham, supra, at
770.
3. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13
n.9 (1971) (implied private cause of action under Rule lob-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1982)); Jordon Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co.,
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have prompted recognition that promoting settlement is not only a legiti-
mate use of judicial resources,4 but an increasingly necessary one.5 The
efforts of the ADR movement to nudge litigants towards relatively effi-
cient, inexpensive methods of resolving disputes or facilitating settlement
have won praise and support from the judiciary,6 the academic commu-
nity7 and legislators.'
401 F.2d 47, 50 (7th Cir. 1968) (same); see also The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3161-3174 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (criminal defendant entitled to move for dismissal
of indictment or information if not brought to trial within specified period); Lambros,
The Future of Alterative Dispute Resolution, 14 Pepperdine L. Rev. 801, 802 (1987) (in-
crease in litigation attributable to increased interaction between members of society as
well as "social attitudes of our citizens"). But see McMillan & Siegal, Creating a Fast-
Track Alternative Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 Notre Dame L. Rev.
431, 432-33 (1985) (suggesting delay and excessive cost of modem litigation due to dis-
covery rule abuse, pretrial motions practice misuse, laissez-faire judicial management,
insufficient pretrial management and resources). See generally Miller, The Adversary Sys-
tem: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1984) (increase in litigation due to
"massive growth in the number of substantive rights recognized by American law, some
unfortunate side effects of... our extremely permissive and forgiving procedural system,
and the unique economics of the American legal system.").
4. See F. Lacey, The Judge's Role in the Settlement of Civil Suits 25-26 (1977) ("A
dispute resolved through settlement rather than trial, where both sides believe a fair re-
sult has been reached, furthers the ends of justice and good judicial administration.");
Lambros, The Judge's Role in Fostering Voluntary Settlements, 29 Vill. L. Rev. 1363
(particular suitability of judges to encourage settlement). See generally, W. Brazil, Set-
tling Civil Suits: Litigators' Views About Appropriate Rules and Effective Techniques
for Federal Judges (1985) (study of litigators concerning role of courts in settlement ef-
forts); Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory
Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 485, 490-93 (1985) (discussing history of settle-
ment conferences, purpose of Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, and debate over whether attorneys or
judges should initiate and control settlement efforts under the Rule).
5. Courts often express the need for early settlement of cases as a way to help realize
the public policy objective of easing court congestion. See Bass v. Phoenix Seadrill/78,
Ltd., 749 F.2d 1154, 1164 (5th Cir. 1985); ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music
Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 997 (2d Cir. 1983); Anselmo v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 595 F.
Supp. 541, 551 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1985). But see Posner,
The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some
Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 366, 388 (1986) (increasing amount of settle-
ment may result in short term cost reduction, but "in the long run the litigation rate may
rise").
6. See Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D.
83, 94 (1976); Burger, Isn't There A Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 276 (1982); Nelson,
The Immediate Future of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 14 Pepperdine L. Rev. 777, 780
(1987).
7. See Center for Public Resources, Containing Legal Costs; ADR Strategies for
Corporations, Law Firms, and Government (1988). But see Fiss, Against Settlement, 93
Yale L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984) (suggesting that settlement movement unfairly advantages
parties with greater financial resources, and limits role of lawsuits to only resolution of
individual disputes, rather than fulfilling broader societal purpose); Posner, supra note 5,
at 366 (1986) (questioning effectiveness of some ADR methods, including summary jury
trial).
8. Legislators in many states have made the use of alternative procedures mandatory
in certain types of cases. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-133 (1982 & Supp. 1988)
(authorizing court to direct that claims less than $50,000 be arbitrated); Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 1141.11 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989) (local rule may provide for arbitration of
claims of less than $50,000); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7361 (Purdon 1982) (compulsory
SUMMARY JURY TRIALS
The summary jury trial ("SJT") is one of the recent innovations in
dispute resolution. The procedure, developed by Judge Thomas Lam-
bros of the Northern District of Ohio in the early 1980s, uses an advisory
jury and a flexible, but greatly condensed trial procedure in an effort to
facilitate pretrial settlement.9
Although much of the information concerning the value of the SJT is
anecdotal,"0 the procedure appears to be enjoying startling practical suc-
cess."1 The SJT is now used in jurisdictions throughout the nation,12 and
has been endorsed by the Judicial Conference of the United States."3
arbitration for claims of less than $10,000 or $20,000, depending on location); Wash.
Rev. Code. Ann. § 7.06.010 (Supp. 1989) (mandatory arbitration if provided for by local
rule); see also Miller, The Role of Legislation in Fostering ADR, in Removing the Barriers
to the Use of Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution 21 (1984) (background and
history of state and federal ADR legislation); Weller, Ruhnka & Martin, Compulsory
Civil Arbitration: The Rochester Answer to Court Backlogs, 20 Judges' J. 36 (Summer
1981) (examining city's effort to reduce congestion through program of mandatory arbi-
tration).
Legislation to encourage the use of ADR techniques was introduced in two recent
sessions of Congress. See H.R. 473, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. 157 (1987)
(Alternative Dispute Resolution Promotion Act of 1987) (requiring attorneys to inform
litigants of possibility of resolving dispute through ADR, and to certify to court that they
have done so); S. 2038, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 Cong. Rec. 848 (1986) (Alternative
Dispute Resolution Promotion Act of 1986) (same).
9. See Gwin, The Summary Jury Trial: An Explanation and Analysis, 52 Ky. Bench
and Bar 16, 16 (Winter 1988); Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial--An Alternative
Method of Resolving Disputes, 69 Judicature 286, 286 (Feb.- Mar. 1986); Lambros, supra
note 1, at 467; Lambros & Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 Clev. St. L. Rev. 43, 43
(1980).
The summary jury trial is sometimes confused with an entirely distinct procedure
called a mini-trial. The mini-trial is a voluntary procedure in which the disputants pres-
ent their differences to a neutral moderator of their choosing for resolution. See Lam-
bros, supra note 1, at 467; see also Green, Marks & Olson, Settling Large Case Litigation:
An Alternative Approach, 11 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 493, 501-11 (1978) (detailing mini-trial
procedure). The mini-trial is generally used to resolve or promote settlement of complex
business disputes.
10. See, e.g., McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 49 (E.D. Ky. 1988) ("In my
own experience summary jury trials have netted me a savings in time of about 60 days
and I have only used the procedure five times. It settled two of these cases that were set
for 30-day trials."); Spiegel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 829, 834 (1986)
(detailing successful results of Judge Spiegel's use of summary jury trials); Ranii, New
Spurs to Settlement: Summary Jury Trials Gain Favor, Nat'l L.J., June 10, 1985, at 1, col.
6, 30, col. 3 (Hon. Lee West of the District of Oklahoma "estimates that all but four of
the approximately 30 [summary jury trials] that he and his... colleagues have conducted
have resulted in settlement.").
11. In the Northern District of Ohio, over 90 percent of the cases selected for SJT
between 1980 and 1984 settled before they reached trial on the merits. See Lambros,
supra note 1, at 472. But see Posner, supra note 5, at 382 ("crude" study of SJT does not
show increase in judicial efficiency in districts where the technique was used, but "does
not show that the summary jury trial is a failure"). Judge Lambros has estimated that
the use of SJTs in 49 cases saved his district more than $73,000. See Lambros, supra note
1, at 474.
12. See Lambros, supra note 1, at 474-76 (detailing spread of procedure); Ranii, supra
note 10, at 30, col. 1 (same).
13. See Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 88
(1984).
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Despite the general enthusiasm regarding the summary jury trial,
courts disagree as to whether unwilling litigants may be compelled to
participate in the procedure.14 Under one view, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the inherent powers of federal courts authorize the
compulsion of summary jury trials.15 One circuit court of appeals dis-
agrees, however, maintaining that mandatory SJTs are not authorized. 16
This Note argues that mandatory summary jury trials are within the
authority vested in federal courts by statute and by inherent judicial
power. Part I explains briefly the mechanics of the SJT, discusses how it
seeks to encourage settlement, and touches upon the most frequently
voiced criticisms of the procedure. Part II analyzes the possible sources
of authority to compel SJTs in several provisions of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure that give federal courts pretrial authority to compel par-
ties to act. This part also discusses the inherent power of federal courts
to manage and control their dockets, and examines whether that power
might extend to compulsory SJTs. Part III examines the wisdom of forc-
ing participation in the procedure, considering practical and public pol-
icy concerns raised by compulsion. This Note concludes that courts may
compel summary jury trials, and that the use of that authority is a pre-
requisite to the continued expansion in the use of the device as a legiti-
mate alternative to litigation.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Summary Jury Trial Procedure
Flexibility is one of the most distinctive characteristics of the summary
jury trial, 7 allowing the procedure to be tailored to the demands of a
particular dispute.'" The accepted format, however, generally adheres
14. Compare Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1988) (district
court lacks authority to compel participation) with Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am.
v. Century Bank, 695 F. Supp. 1343, 1347 (D. Mass. 1988) (district court may compel
participation in SJT) and McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 44 (E.D. Ky.
1988) (same) and Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D. Fla.
1988) (same) and Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., No. 86-185 (D. Minn.
Nov. 17, 1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database) (same). See generally, Maatman, The
Future of Summary Jury Trials in Federal Courts: Strandell v. Jackson County, 21 J.
Marshall L. Rev. 455 (1988); Comment, Compelled Participation in Summary Jury Tri-
als: A Tale of Two Cases, 77 Ky. L.J. 421 (1988).
15. See Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Century Bank, 695 F. Supp. 1343,
1347 n.3 (D. Mass 1988); McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 48-49 (E.D. Ky.
1988); Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1988); Federal
Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., No. 86-185 (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 1988) (WESTLAW,
Allfeds database).
16. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1988).
17. See Gwin, supra note 9, at 17; Lambros, supra note 9, at 286; Lambros, supra note
1, at 468; infra note 41 and accompanying text.
18. For example, some particularly complex cases may need longer summary jury
trials; a three day summary jury trial recently resulted in the settlement of a complicated
toxic tort dispute. See Two Non-Binding Jury Verdicts Lead To $3.5 Million Toxic Tort
Settlement, 1 Alt. Dispute Resolution Rep. (BNA) 339 (Dec. 23, 1987).
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closely to the original formulation of Judge Lambros. 19 SJTs are con-
ducted only after all pending motions are resolved and after discovery is
completed.2 In fact, a summary jury trial typically represents the par-
ties' final effort at pretrial settlement, and occurs after other efforts at
settlement have failed.21
A magistrate or judge conducts the summary jury trial.22 Potential
jurors23 are taken from the regular jury pool,24 and attorneys for each
side are permitted a limited number of peremptory challenges. 25 After
the judge conducts a brief voir dire,26 the advisory jury is empaneled.27
The jurors are given brief descriptions of the case before the SJT begins,2"
but they generally are not aware until the conclusion of the SJT that their
verdict will not be binding upon the litigants.29
Each side to the dispute is given one hour to set forth an abbreviated
form of its case to the jury.30 To save time, testimony from sworn wit-
nesses is usually excluded; 31 the attorneys present all the evidence and
summarize anticipated witness testimony.32 Formal objections are not
encouraged.33
Following the presentations by counsel, the judge gives an abbreviated
charge on the law, and the jury retires to deliberate. 34 Although the ju-
19. See Lambros, supra note 1, at 470-71; see also Lambros & Shunk, supra note 9, at
58 (sample of SJT rules).
20. See Lambros, supra note 1, at 470.
21. See id. at 463, 468; Lambros & Shunk, supra note 9, at 46 n.18; see, eg., Rocco
Wine Distribs., Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Wine, 596 F. Supp. 617, 620-21 (N.D. Ohio 1984)
(parties to have 30 days to attempt to settle, after which summary jury trial to be held);
see also Lambros, supra note 9, at 286 ("The summary jury trial is intended primarily for
cases that will not settle using more traditional methods.").
22. See Lambros, supra note 1, at 470. The SJT is unusual among ADR techniques
because it depends on the direct and active guidance of ajudge or magistrate. See Brunet,
supra note 1, at 11-12. One district court judge permits a law clerk to preside over the
SJT, while the judge sits as a silent juror. See Levin & Golash, supra note 1, at 38-39.
23. The number of jurors varies. CompareLambros, supra note 1, at 471 (Lambros'
original conception of six-person advisory jury) with Gwin, supra note 9, at 16 ("the court
typically calls ten jurors") and Levin & Golash, supra note 1, at 38 (Judge McNaught of
the District of Massachusetts uses five jurors to assure a majority decision).
24. See Gwin, supra note 9, at 16.
25. See Lambros, supra note 1, at 471.
26. See Lambros & Shunk, supra note 9, at 48.
27. SJT procedures sometimes involve more than one jury. See, eg., Enslen, Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution: Summary Jury Trial in a Toxic Tort Case, Toxics L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 37, at 1016 (Feb. 17, 1988).
28. See Lambros & Shunk, supra note 9, at 47-48.
29. See Gwin, supra note 9, at 16; infra note 38 and accompanying text.
30. See Lambros, note 1, at 471. Although Judge Lambros envisioned a one-day pro-
cedure, some summary jury trials have lasted longer. See Enslen, supra note 27, at 1016
(three-day SJT scheduled); supra note 18.
31. See Lambros, supra note 1, at 471. But see Muehler v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 617
F. Supp. 1370, 1372 (D. Minn. 1985) (live testimony used); Levin & Golash, supra note 1,
at 38 (same).
32. See Lambros, supra note 1, at 471.
33. See id.
34. See id.
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rors are encouraged to return a consensus verdict, separate verdicts are
permitted.35 After the verdict is delivered, the presiding judge frequently
permits counsel to discuss with the jurors their perceptions of the
strengths and weaknesses of each side's case.36 Soon after the verdict, the
parties meet to reconsider settlement possibilities in light of the jury's
decision.3 7
The summary jury trial is strictly advisory;38 the participants may ac-
cept the verdict in whole or in part, or ignore it altogether.39 They re-
main free to insist upon a full binding trial on the merits regardless of the
outcome of the SJT.4° Alternatively, a summary jury trial could be held
on only some of the disputed issues in a case, while others are left for
trial.41 After the SJT, the parties may wish to settle either the entire case
based on the information obtained during the limited procedure, or only
as to the issues covered in the SJT, and proceed to trial on issues omitted
from the procedure.
B. Goals and Risks of the Summary Jury Trial
Summary jury trials seek to decrease court congestion by facilitating
settlement,42 particularly of difficult or complex cases which threaten to
consume inordinate amounts of court time.43 Judge Lambros conceived
the procedure after realizing that many disputes could be settled with
ease, and to the satisfaction of both sides, if the parties were made aware
of the strength of their case relative to their opponent's.44 Lambros
35. See id.
36. See Gwin, supra note 9, at 17.
37. See Lambros, supra note 9, at 290; Lambros & Shunk, supra note 9, at 48.
38. See Lambros, supra note 1, at 469.
39. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. The parties might, for example, agree
before the summary jury trial begins to accept the advisory jury's verdict as to liability,
but not on the issue of damages.
40. See Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., No. 86-185 (D. Minn. Nov. 17,
1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database); Hittner, The Summary Jury Trial, 51 Texas Bar J.
40, 40 (1988); Lambros, supra note 1, at 469; Posner, supra note 5, at 369.
41. Splitting the procedure has been used in other contexts. See Hittner, supra note
40, at 40 (court may bifurcate the trial, trying liability issue and, if liability is found, then
trying damages; "[e]ither stage of the bifurcated trial may be appropriate for a summary
jury trial").
42. See Lambros, supra note 1 at 468; Maatman, supra note 14, at 457-58; Posner,
supra note 5, at 369.
43. See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 904 (6th Cir.
1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 1171 (1989); Hittner, supra note 40, at 40; Ranii, supra note
10, at 30, col. 1.
Summary jury trials have been used in cases involving a broad range of substantive
issues. See, e.g., Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir.
1988) (breach of construction contract); Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th
Cir. 1987) (civil rights action under 28 U.S.C. § 1983); see also Fraley v. Lake Win-
nepesaukah, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (suggesting use of SJT in negligence
suit); Zatz, Toxic Tort Case Unlikely to Have Settled Without Summary Jury Trial, Law-
yer Says, 2 Alt. Dispute Resolution Rep. (BNA) 145 (April 14, 1988) (describing benefits
of use of SJT in major toxic tort case).
44. See Lambros, supra note 9, at 286.
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thought that
if only the parties could gaze into a crystal ball and be able to predict,
with a reasonable amount of certainty, what a jury would do in their
respective cases, the parties and counsel would be more willing to
reach a settlement rather than going through the expense and aggrava-
tion of a full jury trial.45
In addition to the primary goal of promoting settlement, the procedure
aims to make trial more efficient by clarifying at an early stage which
issues are truly in dispute, and by forcing the participants to consider
carefully the merits of the arguments on both sides of the dispute.46
Despite its promise and apparent success, the summary jury trial is not
the perfect panacea. 47 The procedure, whether voluntary or compelled,
is not appropriate in every instance.48 Moreover, legitimate and thought-
provoking criticism 49 has been raised concerning the effect on the liti-
gants of compulsory use of the summary jury trial. For example, some
participants resent being forced to prepare for a summary jury trial, and
then again for a full trial on the merits should settlement prove elusive. 0
45. Lambros, supra note 1, at 463 (emphasis in original).
46. See Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., No. 86-185 (D. Minn. 1988)
(WESTLAW Allfeds database). Moreover,
[t]he preparation of opening statements and closing arguments, lining up wit-
nesses and documents, and generally getting prepared for the summary jury
trial obviously help[s] the parties prepare for trial on the merits. From the
court's point of view, our preparation of the charge in the summary jury trial
and the preview of the evidence certainly [gives] us a leg up in preparing for
trial on the merits.
Spiegel, supra note 10, at 835.
47. See, e.g., Maatman, supra note 14, at 470-72 (inappropriateness of compelled
summary jury trials); Posner, supra note 5, at 373-74 (questioning effectiveness of sum-
mary jury trial); Spiegel, supra note 10, at 835-36 (common objections to SJT include
extra work and expense, timing of the procedure, and the result of differing verdicts at
SJT and full trial).
48. SITs, however, are especially useful in cases where litigants disagree on the appro-
priate amount of unliquidated damages, where reasonableness or ordinary care standards
require evaluation in light of the facts of the dispute, or where one side misperceives the
strength of his case. See Lambros, supra note 9, at 286; see also Levin & Golash, supra
note 1, at 38 (attempt to use SJT in a particular antitrust case "a mistake"). Because they
are unrecorded and have no precedential value, SJTs are inappropriate in cases that
would set an important precedent or help clarify the law in a disputed area. Likewise,
controversies that turn on the credibility of witness testimony are inappropriate subjects
for SITs. See Spiegel, supra note 10, at 835. But see supra note 43 and accompanying
text.
49. Courts considering the issue of compulsory summary jury trials have not ques-
tioned the constitutionality of the procedure. The absence of constitutional challenges
may be explained by the non-binding nature of the procedure. See Lambros, supra note
1, at 469.
In broader terms, other forms of compulsory ADRs generally are not constitutionally
infirm. See Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 569-71 (E.D. Penn. 1979);
Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421,427 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 603 F.2d 646 (7th
Cir. 1979); Davidson v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, 462 F. Supp. 778, 781 (D. Md. 1978)
aff'd, 617 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980).
50. See Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., No. 86-185 (D. Minn. Nov. 17,
19881
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Nevertheless, the preparation for summary jury trial would almost cer-
tainly help litigants prepare for a full trial of their dispute. 1
More troubling than complaints of double preparation, however, are
questions concerning the compulsory summary jury trial's impact on dis-
covery and work product rules. 2 The plaintiffs in Strandell v. Jackson
County,53 for example, argued that a compulsory summary jury trial
would force them to tip their hand by revealing trial strategy or privi-
leged testimony, and threaten work product protections, giving their op-
ponents unfair advantages at trial." The work product objection raised
in Strandell, however, does not pose a problem in a significant number of
disputes.
Summary jury trials are not conducted until discovery has been com-
pleted,55 and thus participants enter the procedure already familiar with
the facts of the case of their opponent. As a result, evidence presented at
trial should not be a surprise. 6 A competent attorney, through careful
analysis of material obtained during discovery, should be able to form a
general understanding of the trial strategy his opponent would use even
before the SJT begins.57 In addition, as SJTs are measures of last resort
held after the parties have discussed the case and their positions in the
1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database) ("The parties argue that the investment of attorney
time and money would be wasted on the SJT proceeding. However, an investment of
three days for the SIT when compared to a potential real jury trial lasting four-to-six
courtroom weeks is reasonably proportionate."); see also McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc.,
120 F.R.D. 43, 46 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (noting that summary jury trials may require extra
preparation, but "so do pretrial orders, memoranda, conferences, marking of exhibits,
etc.").
51. See Spiegel, supra note 10, at 835.
52. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1987). The work
product and trial strategy problems arise only in the mandatory SJT context, because
litigants who participate voluntarily are able to balance for themselves the interests of
efficiency against those of confidentiality. See Maatman, supra note 14, at 479.
53. 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987). In Strandell, an attorney representing a civil rights
plaintiff was held in criminal contempt by a district court for failing to proceed as ordered
with a summary jury trial. The district court based its authority to compel participation
in part on Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a) and (c). See Strandell v. Jackson County, 115 F.R.D.
333, 335 (S.D. Ill. 1987). The court also noted that "[t]he ability of a court to use its best
judgment to move its crowded docket must be preserved, where it involves a non-binding
yet highly successful procedure." Id. at 336. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed, and vacated the contempt judgment. See Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888.
54. See Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888 (discovery and work product rules "reflect...
balance between the needs for pretrial disclosure and party confidentiality. Yet, a com-
pelled summary jury trial could easily upset that balance by requiring disclosure of infor-
mation obtainable, if at all, through the mandated discovery process."); see also
Maatman, supra note 14, at 472 (sharing Strandell court's concerns about premature
revelation); Spiegel, supra note 10, at 835 ("some lawyers have been concerned that the
summary jury trial requires them to show, in advance, their trial strategy").
55. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
56. See McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 48 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Shepard's
Discovery Proceedings in Federal Practice § 1.1 (W. Windborne ed. 1983).
57. The plaintiff's attorney in Strandell objected to the mandatory summary jury trial
in part because he claimed that it would force him to reveal some testimony that the
defense had failed to investigate during discovery. See Maatman, supra note 14, at 475.
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course of previous settlement efforts, 8 it is unlikely that trial will yield
significant surprises. Furthermore, argument that a pretrial procedure
will reveal surprises a litigant wishes to hold for trial goes against the
purpose of pretrial practice, which is to minimize surprises at trial. 9
"Trial by ambush" is no longer a legitimate trial tactic, in light of the
emphasis in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on limiting surprises at
trial.Y
The discretionary nature of mandating SJT participation allows for ju-
dicial consideration of the potential harms of the procedure. Judges may
consider the possibility that a compulsory summary jury trial will cause
unfair revelation of trial strategy when deciding whether the procedure is
appropriate in a particular dispute.61 If the court determines that privi-
leged material might be revealed, the procedure can be tailored to avoid
that threat.62 If the judge determines that unfair prejudice cannot be
eliminated by tailoring the SJT, the parties may proceed directly to trial.
Thus, the objections raised to mandatory SJTs, though significant, are
not insurmountable. Judges contemplating use of a compulsory sum-
mary jury trial must consider very carefully whether the procedure is
appropriate in light of the particular facts of the case,63 and do so in view
of the procedure's impact on the litigants.
II. AUTHORITY FOR COMPULSORY SUMMARY JURY TRIALS
A. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Judge Lambros found authority for federal judges to conduct sum-
58. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
59. See McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 48 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Clark, Sum-
mary and Conclusion to an Understanding Use of Pre-trial, 29 F.R.D. 454, 456 (1962); see
also Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16: Advisory Committee Note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 205-06
[hereinafter Advisory Committee Notes] (purpose of pretrial conferences under Rule 16 is
to eliminate surprise).
60. See C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 81 (4th ed. 1983); see, e.g., Erskine v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 814 F.2d 266, 272 (6th Cir. 1987); Woods v. International Har-
vester Co., 697 F.2d 635, 639 (5th Cir. 1983); Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 528 F.2d 395,
404 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-
Canada, Inc., No. 86-185 (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database).
61. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
62. Limiting the coverage of a compulsory summary jury trial has been proposed in
other contexts. Judge David Hittner of the Southern District of Texas has suggested that
compulsory summary jury trials be bifurcated when helpful, "that is, first try the liability
issue and if liability is found, then try the damage issue. Either stage of the bifurcated
trial may be appropriate for a summary jury trial." Hittner, supra note 40, at 40.
63. The decision whether or not to hold a summary jury trial, according to Judge
Lambros, "rarely turns on the substantive legal aspects of a case, but rather depends
upon the dynamics of the controversy." Lambros, supra note 9, at 286; see also Spiegel,
supra note 10, at 835 ("I plan to schedule summary jury trials in those cases which will
take over a week to try where there has been a jury demand, and where the case seems
appropriate, such as in cases based on circumstantial evidence rather than those where
credibility of the witnesses is paramount."); Comment, supra note 14, at 438 (judge must
consider expense of procedure and pressure placed on participating attorneys).
1988]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57
mary jury trials rooted in several of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure." The debate over whether the Rules provide authority to compel
SJTs, however, has focused primarily65 on several provisions of Rule 16
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.66
Rule 16 empowers judges to order attorneys and pro se litigants to
appear before the court at pretrial conferences,67 and authorizes harsh
64. Judge Lambros found authority to conduct SJTs in Rules 16 and 39(c), as well as
in local rules enacted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 83. See Lambros, supra note 1, at 469-70.
65. Local rules concerning SJTs enacted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 83 have figured in
decisions concerning the legitimacy of compulsory summary jury trials. See Federal Re-
serve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., No 86-185 (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 1988) (WESTLAW,
Allfeds database); McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 44 (E.D. Ky. 1988); see
also Lambros, supra note 1, at 469-70. The presence of a local rule, however, is not a
major consideration in this analysis of mandatory SJTs for two reasons. First, this Note
argues that courts have authority to compel participation regardless of the presence or
absence of a local rule. Second, the presence of a local rule allowing compulsion would
do nothing to address serious questions about the procedure like those raised by the court
in Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987). See Comment, supra note
14, at 433-34.
66. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1987); Home Own-
ers Funding Corp. of Am. v. Century Bank, 695 F. Supp. 1343, 1347 n.3 (D. Mass. 1988);
McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 47-48 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Arabian Am. Oil
Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988); Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-
Canada, Inc., No. 86-185 (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database);
Lambros, supra note 1, at 469; Maatman, supra note 14, at 461; Posner, supra note 5, at
385.
Rule 16 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Pretrial Conferences; Objectives. In any action, the court may in its dis-
cretion direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to
appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes as
(1) expediting the disposition of the action;
(2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not be
protracted because of lack of management;
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities;
(4) improving the quality of the trial through more thorough preparation,
and;
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case.
(c) Subjects to be Discussed at Pretrial Conferences. The participants at any
conference under this rule may consider and take action with respect to
(1) the formulation and simplification of the issues, including the elimina-
tion of frivolous claims or defenses;
(7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to
resolve the dispute;
(10) the need for adopting special procedures for managing potentially diffi-
cult or protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties,
difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems; and
(11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.
67. Recent decisions have expanded pretrial authority to permit courts to compel
represented parties to appear for settlement conferences. See G. Heileman Brewing Co.
v. Joesph Oat Corp., No. 86-3118, slip op. at 2 (7th Cir. March 27, 1989); Lockhart v.
Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44, 46 (E.D. Ky. 1987).
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sanctions against those who disobey such orders, or who fail to take part
in pretrial procedure in good faith.68 The Rule was extensively amended
during a general overhaul of the Federal Rules in 1983.69 The revisions
in Rule 16 were designed not only to strengthen7 ° the powers of courts to
control pretrial case management and scheduling,71 but also to reflect the
increasingly active role in guiding pretrial procedure that many courts
had assumed at the time of the 1983 changes.72 As a result of the revi-
sions, encouraging settlement is now one of the express goals of pretrial
procedures under Rule 16(a).73
The authority granted to courts by the Federal Rules to secure effec-
tive and focused pretrial procedure was intended to be subject to broad
interpretation.74 While Rule 16 plainly states that courts are empowered
to direct counsel and unrepresented parties to appear for pretrial confer-
ences, 75 and even though it offers a list of suggested topics for considera-
tion at such meetings,76 the Rule is silent concerning the form or
procedure to be followed by parties at such a gathering. Absent an ex-
plicit definition of the form of a pretrial conference, Rule l's construction
requirement that the Federal Rules be "construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action" 77 strongly sug-
gests that the provisions of Rule 16 should not be read to limit such
pretrial meetings to those which are traditionally defined as conferences.
On the contrary, because the term is not defined, it should be broadly
read.
The Advisory Committee's commentary confirms that the drafters of
Rule 16 did not intend to limit judges to particular forms of pretrial pro-
ceedings. In fact, the Advisory Committee indicated in its commentary
to the 1983 amendments that the Rule was intended to allow for a range
of pretrial techniques under Rule 16.78 In commenting on Rule
16(c)(10)'s reference to pretrial discussion of "the need for adopting spe-
68. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f).
69. See Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 59, at 201-05.
70. See Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., No. 86-185 (D. Minn. Nov. 17,
1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database).
71. See Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 59, at 206, 207; see also Federal Reserve
Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., No. 86-185 (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds
database) (1983 amendments intended to strengthen court's ability to manage their
caseloads).
72. See Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 59, at 207, 211. For example, the
amendments recognized the fact that settlement had become a topic commonly discussed
at Rule 16 conferences. See C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Proce-
dure, Civil § 1525, at 592 (1971 & Supp. 1986).
73. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5).
74. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
75. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a).
76. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(1)-(11).
77. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; see also Real v. Hogan, 828 F.2d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 1987) ("The
Federal Rules must be construed to secure not only the 'just' but the 'speedy' determina-
tion of every action.").
78. See Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 59, at 211.
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cial procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions,"
the Advisory Committee stated: "Clause 10 provides an explicit authori-
zation for such procedures and encourages their use. No particular tech-
niques have been described; the Committee felt that flexibility and
experience are the keys to efficient management of complex cases."7 9
Rule 16 never specifically addressed the summary jury trial, but its text
seems to give judges and litigants a free hand in the procedures they may
use.
Some courts have taken the words of the Advisory Committee to
heart, and have interpreted Rule 16 broadly. The Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, however, held that Rule 16 does not authorize compulsory
SJTs in Strandell v. Jackson County." Much of Strandell's analysis fo-
cused not on the text of the Rule, but on a single sentence of the Advi-
sory Committee notes on Rule 16(c).81 That sentence confirms that the
purpose of 16(c) is to foster settlement, not to "impose settlement negoti-
ations on unwilling litigants."'8'  The Strandell court seized on these
words as support for the conclusion that compulsory SJTs were outside
the scope of Rule 16.83 Strandell's analysis, however, reflects a funda-
mental misunderstanding of the purpose of mandatory SJTs. Summary
jury trials, whether voluntary or compelled, are not settlement negotia-
tions.84 Instead, the procedure is designed to foster settlement by ensur-
ing that any settlement negotiations that actually take place are rendered
as effective as possible by providing litigants with a realistic preview of
79. Id.
80. 838 F.2d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1987). Compare Home Owners Funding Corp. of
Am. v. Century Bank, 695 F. Supp. 1343, 1347 n.3 (D. Mass. 1988); McKay v. Ashland
Oil Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 47-48 (E.D. Ky. 1988) and Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119
F.R.D. 448, 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988) and Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., No.
86-185 (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database) with Strandell v. Jack-
son County, 838 F.2d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1987).
The Seventh Circuit's tradition of narrowly interpreting Rule 16 is not limited to the
summary jury trial context. Compare Identiseal Corp. v. Positive Identification Sys.,
Inc., 560 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1977) (Rule 16 pretrial authority of district court does not
authorize compelling plaintiff to conduct additional discovery, under threat of dismissal
of action) and J.F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542
F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (Rule 16 does not authorize compulsion of stipu-
lation of facts) with G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., No. 86-3118 (7th Cir.
March 27, 1989) (district court may compel represented parties to attend pretrial settle-
ment conferences) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database) and In re LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753 (6th
Cir. 1974) (district court may compel attendance of insurer's claim manager (treated as
party to action) at pretrial settlement conference).
The Seventh Circuit's recent reconsideration of its holding in the Heileman case may
signal a shift in the court's view of its Rule 16 authority. See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v.
Joseph Oat Corp., No. 86-3118 (7th Cir. March 27, 1989) (WESTLAW, Allfeds
database).
81. See Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887.
82. Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 59, at 210.
83. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1987).
84. Judge Lambros indicated that parties could consider new positions on settlement
that might have resulted from the summary jury trial at a meeting after the completion of
the procedure. See Lambros, supra note 9, at 290; supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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their chances of success at trial." The purpose of the procedure, far
from being contrary to the goals of Rule 16(c), is precisely the same.86
Keeping the goals of Rule 16 in mind, as one court has stated, "[i]t is
hard to imagine that the drafters of the 1983 Amendments actually in-
tended to strengthen courts' ability to manage their caseloads while at
the same time intended to deny the court the power to compel participa-
tion by the parties to the litigation. '87  Reading SJTs into the Rules is
consistent with the Rules' purpose8 of bolstering the ability of federal
courts to manage increasingly congested dockets.89
B. Inherent Power of Federal Courts
Federal decisions over the years have recognized a set of nebulous
powers vested in federal courts,9" distinct from those powers explicitly
85. Courts do not have the power to impose settlement on unwilling parties. See
Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985). Therefore, the distinction between a
compulsory summary jury trial and imposing settlement negotiations is critical. See
Strandell v. Jackson County, 115 F.R.D. 333, 336 (S.D. Ill.) (Advisory Committee com-
ments to Rule 16(c) "do not, however, mean this Court lacks the power to order the
litigants to engage in a process which will enhance the possibility of fruitful negotia-
tions.") rev'd 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987); Hittner, supra note 40, at 40 (" 'A summary
jury trial is a forum for early case evaluation and development of realistic settlement
negotiations.' ") (quoting Texas Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures Act, Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. [§ 154.026(a)] (Vernon Supp. 1989).
86. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
87. Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., No. 86-185 (D. Minn. Nov. 17,
1988) (WESTLAW, Alfeds database).
88. The SJT and Rule 16 have common goals: early settlement, compare supra note 9
and accompanying text (SJT) with Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 59, at 210 (Rule
16); clarification of disputed issues, compare supra note 46 and accompanying text with
Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 59, at 209 ("The reference in Rule 16(c)(1) to 'for-
mulation' is intended to clarify and confirm the court's power to identify the litigable
issues.").
89. See Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 59, at 207.
90. See, eg., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-67 (1980) (inherent
power to assess attorneys' fees); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629 (1962)
(inherent power used to dismiss action because of inaction); Michaelson v. United States,
266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924) (inherent power to punish contempt); Ex Parte Peterson, 253 U.S.
300, 312 (1920) (appointment of auditors authorized by courts' "inherent power to pro-
vide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their du-
ties"); Barnd v. City of Tacoma, 664 F.2d 1339, 1342 (9th Cir. 1982) (inherent power to
sanction attorney conducting litigation in bad faith); Hyler v. Reynolds Metal Co., 434
F.2d 1064, 1065 (5th Cir. 1970) (inherent power to dismiss case for failure to prosecute),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 912 (1971); Provenza v. H & W Wrecking Co., 424 F.2d 629, 630
(5th Cir. 1970) (same); Torino v. Texaco, Inc., 378 F.2d 268, 270 (3d Cir. 1967) (same).
The presence of inherent powers that act beyond the scope of Rule 16 authority has also
been recognized. See J.F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp.,
542 F.2d 1318, 1323 (7th Cir. 1976).
State courts also exercise inherent powers. See, eg., Smothers v. Lewis, 672 S.W.2d
62, 64 (Ky. 1984) (court's inherent power to take actions reasonably necessary to admin-
ister justice); Dibble v. State, 279 S.C. 592, 595, 310 S.E.2d 440, 442 (S.C. Ct. App. 1983)
(same). Some powers now explicitly granted to federal courts by Congress were origi-
nally categorized as inherent powers. See, eg., Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d
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granted by statute.91 Numerous formulations of these inherent powers
have been offered,92 and at the core of all these definitions is the concept
of necessity; inherent powers are those powers that, though never specifi-
cally granted, courts exercise in order to perform essential functions.93
Inherent powers are, by their nature, flexible, and used largely on an ad
hoc basis.94 Because the scope of the powers is not expressly limited, as
is the judiciary's statutory authority, courts must exercise these powers
with careful consideration of their effect on the rights of litigants.9 The
Strandell court, for example, required that inherent powers be exercised
in "'due cognizance both of the need for expedition of cases and the
protection of individual rights.' "96
Two principal considerations govern the inquiry into the appropriate-
557, 562 n.8 (3d Cir. 1985) (contempt power "rooted principally in the inherent powers
of the judiciary" now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982)).
91. Cf. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512-13 (1868) (appellate power of
federal courts, though granted by Constitution, is limited by Congress).
92. See, ag., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (inherent
powers are those "'necessary to the exercise of all others.' ") (quoting United States v.
Hudson, 2 U.S. 445, 447, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812)); J. Cratsley, Inherent Powers of the
Courts 2 (1980) ("Inherent powers... consist of all powers reasonably required to enable
a court to perform efficiently its judicial functions ... and to make its lawful actions
effective. These powers are inherent in the sense that they exist because the court exists
...."); 21 C.J.S. Courts § 31 (1940) ("The inherent powers of courts are derived from the
laws to which courts owe their existence, and do not exist without express or implied
grant.").
Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985), includes one of the few
careful analyses of the inherent powers exercised by federal courts. The Eash court iden-
tifed three types of inherent powers. See id. at 562-64. The first, irreducible inherent
authority, was said to stem "from the fact that once Congress has created lower federal
courts and demarcated their jurisdiction, the courts are vested with judicial powers pur-
suant to Article III." Id. at 562. The second use of the term deals with powers that
federal courts invoke, by strict functional necessity, in order to exercise their other pow-
ers. See id. at 562-63. The Supreme Court has termed this type of inherent power "es-
sential to the administration of justice" and " 'absolutely essential' for the functioning of
the judiciary." Id. at 563 (quoting Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924);
Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960)). The third type of inherent power
discussed by the Eash court is sometimes said to be "rooted in the notion that a federal
court, sitting in equity, possesses all of the common law equity tools of a Chancery Court
(subject, of course, to congressional limitation) to process litigation to ajust and equitable
conclusion." Eash, 757 F.2d at 563 (citing ITT Community Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569
F.2d 1351, 1359 (5th Cir. 1978)).
93. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (quoting United
States v. Hudson, 2 U.S. 445, 447, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812)). Other necessary functions of
the courts said to be authorized by inherent powers include raising funds for operations,
and hiring and compensating court personnel. See J. Cratsley, supra note 92, at 18.
94. See Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561-62 ("The notion of inherent
power has been described as nebulous, and its bounds as 'shadowy'.") (quoting Rosen-
berg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 480, 485 (1958)).
95. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) ("Because inherent
powers are shielded from direct democratic controls, they must be exercised with re-
straint and discretion.").
96. Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting S. Rep.
No. 1744, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3023,
3026).
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ness of a particular proposed application of inherent powers. First,
courts should determine whether similar uses of inherent power have
been upheld in the past, or whether the proposed action represents a new
and possibly suspect expansion of those powers.97 Second, the impact of
the use of that power on the dispute and on the rights of the litigants
must be addressed. 98 These considerations, applied to the compulsory
SJT debate, reveal that the procedure is well within the existing scope of
inherent powers, and that its use need not intrude prohibitively on the
rights of parties to the dispute.
The consideration of the scope of past uses of inherent powers must be
focused on the particular manifestation of the inherent powers9 9 that per-
mits federal courts to act as they deem necessary to control their own
dockets and provide for efficient management of their caseloads.lc This
species of inherent power has been invoked as support for a variety of
actions designed to promote judicial efficiency. For example, the inher-
ent power of docket control has authorized the imposition of a broad
range of sanctions against litigants who delay court proceedings or fail to
vigorously prosecute their cases.101 Court costs have been imposed in
order to promote the goals of Rule 1, which calls for the "just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action."102 Attorneys' fees have
been imposed on lazy litigants based on inherent power justification. 103
In particularly egregious instances of delay, courts have been willing to
dismiss the plaintiff's entire action."°4 All the sanctioning actions taken
by federal courts invoking inherent power to control dockets punish liti-
gants in a way which permanently affects them or their action,10 5 and
97. See infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
98. See infra note 113-119 and accompanying text.
99. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 886-87 (7th Cir. 1987); Federal
Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., No. 86-185 (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 1988) (WESTLAW,
Allfeds database); McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 48 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Ara-
bian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1988); see also Cincinnati
Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 117 F.R.D. 597, 599 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (power to
conduct summary jury trials comes from inherent powers of courts).
100. See, eg., Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962); Eash v. Riggins
Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985); J.F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson
Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d 1318, 1323 (7th Cir. 1976).
101. See Moulton v. Commissioner, 733 F.2d 734, 735 (10th Cir. 1984); Penthouse
Int'l Ltd. v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 663 F.2d 371, 386 (2d Cir. 1981).
102. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; see Moulton v. Commissioner, 733 F.2d 734, 735 (10th Cir.
1984) (affirming order imposing double costs and attorney's fees on litigant who had
taken a frivolous appeal from a tax deficiency judgment).
103. See Barnd v. City of Tacoma, 664 F.2d 1339, 1342 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Road-
way Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980) (attorneys' fees as sanction for abu-
sive litigation practice).
104. Even though dismissal of pending actions for failure to prosecute is now provided
for under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41, some courts rely instead (or in addition) upon their inherent
authority to control their docket when imposing this harsh sanction. See, e.g., Link v.
Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962); Penthouse Int'l Ltd. v. Playboy Enters., Inc.
663 F.2d 371, 386 (2d Cir. 1981).
105. But see infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
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that may decrease their chances of ultimate success.
Use of the power to control dockets has not been limited to sanctions;
courts have also taken positive action to ensure that their business is not
delayed. For example, in Ex Parte Peterson,"°6 the Supreme Court up-
held the appointment of an auditor, without the consent of the parties to
the dispute, to examine and report on the business records of the liti-
gants. 10 7 The appointment was justified as an exercise of the courts "in-
herent power to provide itself with this instrument for the administration
of justice when deemed by it essential." 10
The accepted uses of the inherent powers of federal courts, detailed
above, strongly indicate that those powers require no further expansion
to embrace compulsory summary jury trials. Mandatory summary jury
trials, though clearly not appropriate as punitive measures, serve the
same purpose as sanctions in helping to prevent pretrial delay."° Sanc-
tions reduce delay by deterring insubstantial participation, SJTs by re-
ducing congestion through encouraging settlement. Moreover, because
the participants in a summary jury trial invest a relatively small amount
of time in the procedure,110 are in no way bound by its outcome,"' and
suffer no impairment of the viability of their action, 112 the mandatory
summary jury trial is a far less intrusive use of the court's powers than
previous uses of this species of inherent power.
The second consideration, determining the appropriateness of an exer-
cise of inherent powers to compel SJTs, requires addressing the proce-
dure's effects on the rights of litigants in a particular instance." 3 As
inherent power is currently used to authorize dismissal and other sanc-
tions to promote judicial efficiency, it would defy logic to suggest that it
would not authorize a brief, non-binding procedure with the same goal.
The Seventh Circuit in Strandell, however, found that inherent powers
could not justify compulsory summary jury trials.' 4 The court based
this conclusion on the premise that inherent powers had to be exercised
"in a manner that is in harmony with the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,""' 5 and that exercise of the powers as authority for compulsory
106. 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
107. See id. at 312.
108. Id.
109. Sanctions imposed through the use of the inherent powers of the courts seek not
only to punish the particular individual involved, but also to promote efficient procedure
in the long run by discouraging similar conduct in the future. See Barnd v. City of Ta-
coma, 664 F.2d 1339, 1342 (9th Cir. 1982).
110. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
114. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 886-87 (7th Cir. 1987). The
Strandell court, however, did acknowledge courts' "substantial inherent power to control
and to manage [their] docket[s]." Id. at 886.
115. Id.
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SJTs would be contrary to Rule 16116 and to the rules governing discov-
ery and work product privilege.117 As seen above, the compulsion of
SJTs is within the scope of the term "conference" under the Rule 16.11
Even if the Rule does not expressly authorize the procedure, it is cer-
tainly in harmony with Rule 16, when read in light of the mandate of
Rule l's call for efficiency. Furthermore, though they pose significant
problems, work product concerns and the threat of premature revelation
of trial strategy can be avoided by tailoring the procedure to avoid such
problems." 19 In short, the complete prohibition of compulsory SJTs is an
unnecessarily broad prophylactic measure.
III. POLICY: WHY COMPEL SUMMARY JURY TRIALS?
Although authority for the compulsory use of the summary jury trial
procedure may be present, the wisdom of compelling the procedure mer-
its separate attention. A number of policy considerations are served by
permitting mandatory use of the procedure, indicating that judges should
not hesitate to order participation in instances where they believe. it
would be helpful and appropriate.
The success of the SJT suggests the most obvious reason for compel-
ling the procedure.' 20 The SJT has been shown to be effective in advanc-
ing the judicial policy of reducing congestion on federal dockets.12 1
Recognizing the power to compel the procedure in appropriate situations
will lead to more frequent use, thereby promoting the well-defined goals
of pretrial efficiency and reduction of cost. If, however, participants
choose not to participate meaningfully in the procedure, it might be ren-
dered a waste of time rather than a device for promoting judicial effi-
ciency. Several factors, however, tend to minimize that danger. First,
unwilling participants will risk incurring sanctions under Rule 16(f) for
withholding good faith participation. 122 In addition, represented parties,
though involved in the procedure against their will, would be unwilling
to finance their attorney's less than zealous participation in the SJT, and
would likely pressure counsel to make the time spent as meaningful as
possible under the circumstances. 123
Finally, the major obstacle to widespread use of SJTs are the suspi-
cions of unwary practitioners, unaware of the benefits of the proce-
dure.' 24 By ordering SJTs in certain instances, judges not only improve
116. See id. at 887.
117. See id. at 888.
118. See supra notes 65-90 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
121. See id.
122. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f).
123. An attorney has an ethical responsibility to represent his client zealously. See
Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7 (1979).
124. See Ranii, supra note 10, at 30, col. 3. A litigant is likely to feel a certain sense of
emotional satisfaction after having some form of a "day in court." See Lambros, supra
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the chances that the particular dispute will be resolved efficiently, but
increase the number of practitioners who will feel comfortable with the
procedure in the future.125
CONCLUSION
Careful analysis of the applicable provisions of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and of the Advisory Committee notes on those sections
confirms that compulsory summary jury trials are within the authority of
federal courts. Even without Federal Rules authority, compelling the
procedure falls within the inherent power of federal courts to manage
and control their dockets. In light of these sources of authority, and
looking to the promise of the SJT to reduce congestion in the federal
courts, judges should consider compelling litigants to participate in sum-
mary jury trials in appropriate instances.
William E. Craco
note 1, at 468. The SJT provides such satisfaction without the necessity of vindicating
one side of the dispute at the expense of the other. Such emotional benefits are not lim-
ited to litigants. See Ranii, supra note 10, at 30, col. 2 (SJT emotionally satisfying for
lawyers as well).
125. See Ranii, supra note 10, at 30, col. 3 (compelling use of SJTs in District of
Oklahoma causes local bar to be "largely converted" to the procedure).
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